University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

1928

Current Conflicts between the Commerce Clause
and State Police Power, 1922-1927
Thomas Reed Powell

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Powell, Thomas Reed, "Current Conflicts between the Commerce Clause and State Police Power, 1922-1927" (1928). Minnesota Law
Review. 2418.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2418

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

CURRENT CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE AND STATE POLICE POWER, 1922-1927t
By THOMAS REED POWELL*
1 STATE POWER IN

THE ABSENCE OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

(Concluded)

T

HE preceding instalment has dealt with cases in which the
commerce clause has been invoked against state regulation
of motor vehicles, gas ind electricity, ferries, and trains. While
these are all cases in which transportation was involved, they
are not all the cases during the quinquennium in which transportation was involved. One of the cases in the ensuing section
on Sales has to do with license requirements on brokers of steamship tickets, and the succeeding section on rights of action and
subjection to suit deals indiscriminately with cases involving
transporters and vendors. Carriers are the complainants in most
of the cases in the instalment to follow on state police power
after Congressional action. In a sense, of course, all the commerce-clause cases involve transportation, because the interstate
elejnent in all cases involving commerce must be introduced by
transportation that has brought goods into the state or anticipated transportation that will take them out of the state. Yet
a distinction is to be drawn between regulation that is addressed
to the carrier and regulation that is addressed to some one else.
The cases immediately to follow have the common element that
in none of them is it a carrier who is asking for relief under the
commerce clause.
Sales.-When the commerce clause is adduced to escape from
state licensing requirements, there are presented the questions
whether the business involved is interstate commerce and, if so,
whether the state requirements are "direct burdens" thereon and
therefore invalid or "merely incidentally affect" the interstate
commerce and are therefore permissible. Obviously these two
categories do not announce with precision the line between good
and evil and their scope and limits can be known only by following their authoritative judicial application. Where the socalled license is nothing more than a fiscal device, it must fail
tContinued
from 12 MINNESOTA LAW REmEw 321-40.
*Professor of
Law, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass.
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if the enterprise involved is interstate commerce. 30 Often, bowever, the fee associated with the license is professedly exacted
in the name of compensation for the expenses incident to the
official supervision of the activities of the enterpriser. Where
this supervision consists of inspection, the constitution permits
compensatory fees in state inspection of imports and exports and
is construed to contain the same grace in respect to goods which
have originated in or are destined for another state. The sanction
of merely compensatory fees necessarily carries with it the sanction of the inspective intrusion with which the fees are associated.
Intrusions which go beyond what is considered inspection still
have a chance to be applied to interstate commerce if the court
concludes that their impediments to interstate commerce are outweighed by their ministrations to worthy local needs.3 1 *So much
for the amorphous formulations of the law. Now for their applications.
3
ODuring the last quinquennium, license or franchise taxes on
enterprises wholly interstate were declared invalid in Texas Transport
Co. v. New Orleans, (1924) 264 U. S. 150, 44 Sup. Ct. 242, 68 L. Ed.
611; Ozark Pipe Line Corporation v. Monier, (1925) 266 U. S. 255,
45 Sup. Ct. 184, 69 L. Ed. 439, noted in 25 Colum. L. Rev. 506; 38
Harv. L. Rev. 1116; 19 Ill. L. Rev. 665; and 3 Tex. L. Rev. 454; and
Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, (1925) 268 U. S. 203,
45 Sup. Ct. 477, 69 L. Ed. 916, noted in'39 Harv. L. Rev. 396. The
problems of these cases are discussed in Louis H. Porter, "State Excise
Taxes as Limited by the Federal Constitution," Proc. 16th Ann. Conf.
Nat. Tax Ass'n 116, and Thomas Reed Powell, "Business Taxes and
the Federal
Constitution," Proc. 18th Ann. Conf. Nat. Tax Ass'n 164.
31
In Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., (1925) 268 U. S. 189, 199, 45
Sup. Ct. 481, 69 L. Ed. 909, Mr. Justice Van Devanter puts the applicable canons as follows:
"The decisions of this court respecting the validity of state laws
challenged under the commerce clause have established many rules
covering various situations. Two of these rules are specially invoked
here-one, that a state statute enacted for admissible state purposes,
and which affects interstate commerce only incidentally and remotely,
is not a prohibited regulation in the sense of that clause; and the
other, that a state statute which, by its necessary operation, directly
interferes with or burdens such commerce, is a prohibited regulation
and invalid, regardless of the purpose with which it was enacted.
These rules, although readily understood and entirely consistent, are
occasionally difficult of application, as where a state statute closely
approaches the line which separates one rule from the other. As
might be expected, the decisions dealing with such exceptional situations have not been in full accord. Otherwise the course of adjudication has been consistent and uniform."
This statement of the antithetical canons seems faulty in that it
makes the issue turn exclusively upon the degree or manner of interference with interstate commerce and excludes from consideration the
purpose of the state regulation, whereas the decisions reveal that the
degree to which and the manner in which a state may affect or burden
interstate commerce vary with the character of the state interests subserved by the regulation.
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By an extension of hitherto known canons it was discovered by
the Supreme Court in 1922 that purchases of grain from North
Dakota farmers for delivery to North Dakota elevators are purchases for extrastate delivery because the purchasers purchase for
that purpose and carry out their purpose habitually and with dispatch.3 2 This was re-affirmed in Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co.3"
which sustained a decree of the district court enjoining the enforcement of the North Dakota Grain Grading Act against the elevator companies. This Act provided for a state supervisor of grades,
weights and measures with authority to establish a system of
grades, etc., subject to the proviso that grades established by the
secretary of agriculture under the United States Grain Standards Act shall be the grades for the state. In the state grading
system the value of "dockage" (chaff, weeds, grain other than
wheat, etc.) was to be considered and the buyer was to pay for
it the fair market value or to separate it and return it to the
vendor. Whether this provision was to apply when grades were
established by the federal secretary of agriculture does not appear
from the opinion of Mr. Justice Van Devanter. The statute further provided for a system of state inspectors and forbade all
except producers to buy wheat by grade unless it had been inspected and graded by a state or federal inspector. This exception
was declared by Mr. Justice Van Devanter to be "an idle provision," because there are no federal inspectors except at terminal markets, of which there are none in North Dakota. He
passes over in silence the possibility that this gap in federal
administration might later be filled. Elevator buyers were required by the state Act to obtain a license and pay a small fee,
to give a bond to the state to secure payment for all wheat bought
on credit, to keep a record of wheat bought and to show therein
the price paid and grades given, together with "the price received
and the grades received at the terminal markets" and to furnish
this information to the state supervisor upon request. All this,
says Mr. Justice Van Devanter, "directly interferes with and
burdens interstate commerce and is an attempt by the state to
prescribe rules under which an important part of such commerce
32
Lemke v. Farmers' Grain Co., (1922) 258 U. S. 50, 42 Sup. Ct.
244, 66 L. Ed. 458, noted in 10 Georgetown L. J. 76; 35 Harv. L. Rev.
883; and 6 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 521. An analogous issue is discussed in6 MINNESOTA LAW REvIEW 61, 69.
33(1925) 268 U. S. 189, 45 Sup. Ct. 481, 69 L. Ed. 909, noted in

21 II. L. Rev. 50.
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shall be conducted," which "no state can do consistently with
the commerce clause." Against the plea that the court should
assume the existence of evils justifying the people of the state
in adopting the Act, Mr. Justice Van Devanter posits the questionbegging assertion that "the answer is that there can be no
justification for the exercise of a power that is not possessed."
Such an answer begs the question because whether the power is
possessed depends upon whether the evils are sufficient to warrant
so great an interference, as, for example, when the state is
3
allowed to forbid the exit of unripe citrus fruits. 4 The state
statute is declared inapplicable to this buying for subsequent
interstate commerce on assertions which would apply equally to
a situation with which Congress had in no wise dealt. The
federal statute comes in, not as a reason why the state statute is
inapplicable, but as an insufficient justification for such application. It was the state which urged that its statute was an attempt
through inspection regulations to aid in carrying out the purposes of the federal Act. To this suggestion Mr. Justice Van
Devanter replied:
"We think the Act discloses an attempt to do much more. To
require that dockage be separated by the buyer and be returned
to the producer unless it be distinctly valued and paid for is not
inspection. Nor does the federal Act contain or give support
to such a requirement. To exclude one from buying by grade
unless he secures a grading license for himself or his agent is
apart from what is usually comprehended in inspection. Nothing
like this is found in the federal Act.. On the contrary, it declares
that persons licensed to grade under it shall not be interested in
any grain elevator, or in buying or selling grain, or be in the
employ of any owner or operator of a grain elevator. Equally
unrelated to inspection are the provisions exacting a bond to
pay for all wheat bought on credit; requiring that a record be kept
of the price paid in buying at the local elevator and the price
received in selling at the terminal market; and authorizing the
state supervisor to investigate and supervise the marketing with
a view to preventing unreasonable margins of profit. None of
these finds any example in the federal Act; and their presence
in the state Act makes it a very different measure from what it
would be without them. Aside from the adoption of the grades
established and promulgated under the federal Act, we find little
in the state Act to support, and much to refute, the assertion
that it is merely an attempt to carry out the purposes of the
federal Act."
34Sligh v. Kirkwood, (1915) 237 U. S. 52, 35 Sup. Ct. 501, 59
L. Ed. 835, noted in 80 Cent. L. J. 361; 19 Law Notes 52; and 13
Mich. L. Rev. 698.
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The reference to the authority of the state supervisor, to
supervise, the marketing with a view to preventing unieasonable
margins of profit may indicate that the Court thought that there
were elements of maximum price-fixing in this North Dakota
statute as in its predecessor which had been declared unconstitutional because of its direct price-fixing provisions. So far as
anything appears from the recital in the opinion the only price
provision in the second statute is confined to payment for dockage,
and this does not fix a price for either the wheat or the chaff.
The opinion deals cumulatively with the provisions of the Act
and so gives no direct light as to what eliminations might render
a substituted statute immune from condemnation under the commerce clause. Its general tenor, however, indicates that the prospect is not rosy for any substituted legislation that North Dakota
would deem it worth while to adopt. Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented without opinion.
It would seem that the situation of fur buyers in Louisiana
is similar to that of grain buyers in North Dakota, yet it was
declared by Mr. Justice Butler in Lacoste v. Departnent of Conservation 5 that the fact that skins and hides bought in Louisiana
are not manufactured into finished products there but are all
shipped outside the state does not prevent the imposition of a
state severance tax of two per cent of the value of all hides and
skins taken from wild animals in the state, although such tax
is imposed on the dealers who buy the hides and ship them outside the state. Although this statute obviously yielded a large
revenue and contained no regulatory provisions other than ones
plainly designed to secure the payment of the tax, Mr. Justice
Butler acquiesced in the declaration of the state court that the
statute was not a revenue Act but a police regulation and said:
"The legislation is a valid exertion of the police power of
the state to conserve and protect wild life for the common benefit. It is within the power of the state to impose the exaction
as a condition precedent to the divestiture of its title and to the
acquisition of private ownership.

.

.

.

The state's power to

tax property is not destroyed by the fact that it is intended for
and will move in interstate commerce. Such skins and hides may
be taxed in the hands of dealers before they move in interstate
commerce.

.

.

.

Failure to levy and enforce the tax before

35(1924) 263 U. S. 544, 44 Sup. Ct. 186, 68 L. Ed. 437, noted in
18 Il. L. Rev. 569 and 22 Mich. L. Rev. 619. For discussions prior
to the Supreme Court decision, see George Vaughan, "The Severance
Tax," 7 Bull. Nat. Tax Ass'n 137, and a note in 23 Colum. L. Rev. 73.
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the skins and hides reach the dealers does not make the necessary
operation and effect of the law an interference with interstate
commerce. The imposition of the tax on the skins and hides
while in the hands of the dealers is calculated to make certain
that all will be found for taxation. No interference with interstate commerce results from the enforcement of the Act. It is
not repugnant to the commerce clause of the constitution."
?The case is, of course, peculiar in that i tdeals with wild game
which the state has been allowed to preserve for local consumption, 36 but Mr. Justice Butler says that "whether the tax here
involved might be upheld by virtue of the power of the state to
prohibit, and therefore to condition, the removal of wild game
from the state, we do not now consider, but dispose of the case
on other grounds." These other grounds, however, include "the
power of the state to impose the exaction as a condition precedent
to the divestiture of its title and to the acquisition of private
ownership." They include also the power of a state to tax
property that has not yet started on its interstate journey. Similar
38
taxes have been sustained on the extraction of ore3r and coal
most of which was destined for other states. These cases indicate the possibility that the court may allow taxation of acts
precedent to interstate shipment where it will not allow police
regulation of the same acts. 39 The principal case does not cast
doubt on this possibility, since it involves what to the untutored
is plainly a tax, though two courts have called it not a revenue
Act but a police regulation, and since it applies only to articles
which the state may keep from private ownership or may keep
from private ownership for interstate shipment while permitting
private ownership for local consumption. The power of the
state to keep the game from private ownership is relied on in
the opinion, though the power to forbid exportation while permitting capture for local consumption is not.
3

"Geer v. Connecticut, (1896) 161 U. S. 519, 16 Sup. Ct. 600, 40
L. Ed.
37 793.
Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, (1923) 262 U. S. 172, 43 Sup.
Ct. 526,
67 L. Ed. 929.
38
Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., (1922) 260 U. S. 245, 43 Sup.
Ct. 83, 67 L. Ed. 237, discussed in Thomas Reed Powell, "State Production Taxes and the Commerce Clause," 12 Calif. L. Rev. 17; and
notes9 in 96 Cent. L. J. 18; 2 Wis. L. Rev. 187; and 32 Yale L. J. 406.
" For a reverse contrast, comrare Sligh v. Kirkwood, (1915) 237
U. S. 52, 35 Sup. Ct. 501, 59 L. Ed. 835. noted in 80 Cent. L. J. 361;
19 Law Notes 52; 13 Mich. L. Rev. 698; allowing a state to forbid
the sale of green lemons for delivery to another state, with Heyman
v. Hays, (1915) 236 U. S.178, 35 Sup. Ct. 403, 59 L. Ed. 527, denyind
to the state the power to, impose a privilege tax on the business of
selling intoxicating liquor for extra-state delivery.
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The contract of sale involved in Flanagan v. Federal Coal
Co.4 0 called for delivery of coal to cars for shipment to another
state. The vendee technically'was to accept the coal in the state
in which it was produced, but the vendor was to consign the coal
to customers of the vendee in other states. The state court had
held that the vendor could not recover for refusal to accept the
coal because at the time of the breach his license as a coal dealer
had expired. Without determining whether the vendor was subject to the license requirement because of other dealings in which
he might be engaged, Mr. Justice Holmes declared that at any
rate he could not be denied recovery on the sales in question, since
they were in interstate commerce. As he puts it:
"It was understood between the parties that these dealings
were steps in sending the coal from the mines to purchasers in
other states. Very likely the Federal Coal Company [the vendee]
might have stopped the coal at Tracy City, in Tennessee [the
state of origin and of delivery to the carrier], but it had no
thought of doing so, and Flanagan [the vendor] understood the
course of business in which he was expected to co-operate and
did co-operate. Therefore in this matter the parties were engaged
in interstate commerce, and the state law, even if valid as a tax,
could not invalidate their contract."
This case follows an earlier one4' which differed only in that
there the delivery in the state of purchase was to cars to be
shipped to the extra-state vendee rather than to purchasers from
him, and that there it was the extra-state vendee whose suit was
held to have been wrongfully denied by the state court for failure
40(1925) 267 U. S. 222, 45 Sup. Ct. 233, 69 L. Ed. 583.
4'Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, (1921) 257 U. S.
282, 42 Sup. Ct. 106, 66 L. Ed. 239, noted in 6 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
317. This Dahnke-Walker Case is cited in General American Tank
Car Corp. v. Day, (1926) 270 U. S. 367, 46 Sup. Ct. 234, 70 L. Ed.
635, in support of the ground on which a complainant urged that a
tax discriminating against non-residents in favor of residents was
an invalid regulation of interstate commerce. The contention was
that this indirect inducement to become domiciled in order to get the
benefit of a lower rate of taxation "is a thinly disguised attempt to
compel non-residents doing interstate business in Louisiana to declare
a domicil in the state, and that it is, therefore, an unconstitutional
burden on interstate commerce, within the principle of those cases
holding that a state may not require a non-resident to procure a
license to do business or to declare a domicil within a state as a
condition to engaging in commerce across its boundaries." This
ingenious way of insisting that a state was in effect requiring a license
to do interstate commerce was not discountenanced bv the court.
though the ruling that there was no invalid discrimination azainst
non-residents made it unnecessary to decide whether such discrimination would be the equivalent of requiring a license or declaring a
dom.cil within the state.
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to have a license to do business as a foreign corporation. That
decision extended the conception of an interstate sale beyond
what was to be inferred from any previous adjudications, but
it seems to be a close precedent for the principal case.42 While
the former was without precedent from the standpoint of the
police power of the state of origin, its refusal to give controlling
weight to the technicalities of the transfer of title bad support
from cases on the power of Congress and on the police and taxing powers of the state of destination. The police power of the
state of destination must meet requirements of the commerce
clause in dealing with the first sale by the vendee in the original
package in which the commodity comes from without the state,
and it is perhaps no less warranted to hold that the police power
of the state of origin must meet requirements of the commerce
clause in dealing with a purchase of goods in which the buyer
calls for delivery to cars for shipment to another state, even
though the contract of sale is fully complied with before the
shipment begins. The extension of the protection of the commerce clause to such sales and purchases does not mean that the
state of origin can in no wise regulate them but settles only that
the state cannot regulate them in a manner or to an extent that
the Supreme Court thinks unwarranted.
The fees charged in connection with the regulation of solicitors
involved in Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. Portland43 were $12.50
quarterly for each person on foot and $25 quarterly if a vehicle
were used. They were thus clearly fiscal in character and invalid
under the commerce clause if the commerce in question was interstate. The goods offered for sale were outside the state at the
time when the sales were solicited and this interstate character
of the commerce was held to be unaffected by the fact that the
solicitors travelled at their own expense and got their compensation through their right to retain the initial cash deposit paid by
the purchaser rather than by direct remittances from the firm
42So also is Spalding & Brothers v. Edwards, (1923) 262 U. S.
66, 43 Sup. Ct. 485, 67 L. Ed. 865, which held that a sale by a New
York manufacturer to a New York commission merchant who ordered
delivery made to an ocean carrier for consignment to a South
American customer of the New York commission merchant a sale
for export and therefore not subject to a federal tax on sales of
athletic supplies.
43(1925) 268 U. S. 325, 45 Sup. Ct. 525, 69 L. Ed. 982, discussed
in John Hemphill, "The House-to-House Canvasser .n Interstate
Commerce," 60 Am. L. Rev. 641, and a note in 4 Tex. L. Rev. 110.
The decision below is considered in 11 Va. L. Rev. 141.
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that supplied and shipped the goods across state lines C. 0. D.
The only regulatoiy feature of the statute was one requiring a
bond of $500 conditioned on making final delivery of the goods
ordered. It was doubtless with reference to this that Mr. Justice
McReynolds declared: "Nor can we accept the theory that an
expressed purpose to prevent possible frauds is enough to justify
legislation which really interferes with the free flow of legitimate
interstate commerce." This free flow was certainly interfered
with by so high a tax as that demanded. W;hether the condemnation of the requirement of a bond is confined to one associated
with such a fiscal demand is not indicated in the brief opinion.
The district court had refused to enjoin the enforcement of the
statute at the suit of the extra-state manufacturers whose goods
were sold by the itinerant solicitors, and this decree was reversed
by the Supreme Court.
A Pennsylvania statute requiring a license of all persons, other
than railroad or steamship corporations, who sell or take orders
for steamship tickets, imposing a fee of $50 a year, and requiring
a bond of $1,000 conditioned on due accounting for all moneys
received for tickets or orders was declared unconstitutional by
a six to three vote in Di Santo v. Pennsylvania44 which reversed
the judgment of the Pennsylvania court sustaining the conviction of one who sold tickets in violation of the statute. After
three paragraphs of recital of the facts Mr. Justice Butler for
the majority contents himself with asserting:
"The soliciting of passengers and the sale of steamship tickets
and orders for passage between the United States and Europe
constitute a well-recognized part of foreign commerce.' See
Davis v. Farmers' Co-operative Co., 262 U. S.312, 315. A state
statute which by its necessary operation directly interferes with
or burdens foreign commerce is a prohibited regulation and
invalid, regardless of the purpose for which it was passed. Shafer
v. Farmers' Grain Co.,'268 U. S. 189, 199, and cases cited. Such
legislation cannot be sustained as an exertion of the police power
of the state to prevent possible fraud. Real Silk Mills v. Portland,
268 U. S. 325, 336. The Congress has complete and paramount
authority to regulate foreign commerce and, by appropriate
measures, to protect the public against the frauds of those who
44(1927) 273 U. S. 34, 47 Sup. Ct. 267, 71 L. Ed. 314, considered
in 100 Cent. L. J. 94; 27 Colum. L. Rev. 573; 22 Il. L. Rev. 197; 26
Mich. L. Rev. 102; 5 N. C. Law Rev. 254; 1 Temple L Q. 155; 5 Tex. L.
Rev. 318; and 36 Yale L. J.706. The decision in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is discussed in 74 U. Pa. L. Rev. 624, and that in the lower
state court, in 74 U. Pa. L. Rev. 92.
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sell these tickets and orders. The sales here in question are related
to foreign commerce as directly as are the sales made in ticket
offices maintained by the carriers and operated by their servants
and employees. The license fee and other things imposed by the
Act on plaintiff in error, who initiates for his principals a transaction in foreign commerce, constitute a direct burden on that commerce. Texas Transport Co. v. New Orleans, 264 U. S. 150,
and McCall v. California, 136 U. S. 104."
For a reasoned consideration of the problem before the court
we must go to the minority opinions. Mr. Justice Brandeis
describes the method by which tickets for intending immigrants
are bought on the instalment plan from brokers in this country
who are commonly of the same nationality, refers to the need
for supervision of these instalment purchases, and then asserts:
"Although the purchase made is of an ocean steamship ticket,
the transaction regulated is wholly intrastate-as much so as if
the purchase were of local real estate or of local theatre tickets.
There is no purpose on the part of the state to regulate foreign
commerce. The statute is not an obstruction to foreign commerce.
It does not discriminate against foreign commerce. It places no
direct burden upon such commerce. It does not affect the commerce except indirectly. Congress could, of course, deal with
the subject, because it is connected with foreign commerce. But
it has not done so. Nor has it legislated on any allied subject.
Thus, there can be no contention that Congress has occupied the
field. And obviously, also, this is not a case in which the silence
of Congress can be interpreted as a prohibition of state actionas a declaration that in the sale of ocean steamship tickets fraud
may be practiced without let or hindrance. If Pennsylvania must
submit to seeing its citizens defrauded, it is not because Congress
has so willed, but because the constitution so commands. I cannot believe that it does."
The opinion then points out that the Pennsylvania statute is
not a revenue law like those involved in two of the cases cited by
the majority, since the Pennsylvania court has found that the
fees no more than pay the cost of supervision. Mr. Justice
Brandeis differentiates the Real Silk Case on the ground that
the ordinance there discriminated against interstate commerce;
but this seems to be erroneous, for nothing in the statement of
facts or opinion in that case indicates that the ordinance was
confined to salesmen who took orders for extra-state principals,
and discrimination is not mentioned as one of the vices in applying the statute to the case before the court. The North Dakota
Grain Case is distinguished because the steamship-ticket statute
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"does not affect the price of articles moving in interstate commerce." Mr. Justice Brandeis deems the regulation of the ticket
agencies as iA essence an inspection law and cites many inspection cases in its support. As to its effect on foreign commerce,
he finds it less direct than the laws which have required tests of
the skill or eyesight of locomotive engineers, required that
passenger cars be heated and guard posts placed on bridges,
Iprescribed the speed and the stops of interstate
trains, fixed
standards for locomotive headlights, prescribed "full crews,"
compelled segregation of races onL trains, and compelled railroads to eliminate grade crossings at possibly ruinous expense,
all of which have been sustained by the Supreme Court. If the
McCall Case, he says, is not to be distinguished because that involved the application of a revenue measure to employees of
carriers, it should be disregarded. This would not mean the
unsettlement of any established principle of law, but merely a
revision of judgment on a question of practical effect, which the
Court has often done in commerce-clause cases. The opinion
closes by saying that "in the case at bar, also, the logic of words
should yield to the logic of realities." In a separate dissent Mr.
Justice Stone says:
"I agree with all that Mr. Justice Brandeis has said, but I
would add a word with respect to one phase of the matter which
seems to me of some importance. We are not here concerned with
a question of taxation to which other considerations may apply,
but with a state regulation of what may be considered to be an
instrumentality of foreign commerce. As this court has man3
times decided, the purpose of the commerce clause was not tc
preclude all state regulation of commerce crossing state lines, but
to prevent discrimination and the erection of barriers or obstacles
to the free flow of commerce, interstate and foreign.
"The recognition of the power of the states to regnlite commerce within certain limits is a recognition that there are matters
of local concern which may properly be subject to state regulation
and which, because of their local character, as well as their number and diversity, can never be adequately dealt with by Congress.
Such regulation, so long as it does not impede the free flow of
commerce, may properly be and for the most part has been left
to the state by the decisions of this court.
"In this case the traditional test of the limit of state action
by inquiring whether the interference with commerce is direct
or indirect seems to me too mechanical, too uncertain in its application, and too remote from actualities, to be of value. In thus
making use of the expressions, 'direct' and 'indirect interference'
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with commerce, we are doing little more than using labels to
describe a result rather than any trustworthy formula by which
it may be reacled.
"It is difficult to say that such permitted interferences as those
enumerated in Mr. Justice Brandeis's opinion are less direct than
the interference prohibited here. But it seems clear that those
interferences not deemed forbidden are to be sustained, not because the effect on commerce is nominally indirect, but because
a consideration of all the facts and circumstances, such as the
nature of the regulation, its function, the character of the business
involved, and the actual effect on the flow of commerce, lead to
the conclusion that the regulation concerns interests peculiarly
local and does not infringe the national interest in maintaining
the freedom of commerce across state lines.
"I am not persuaded that the regulation here is more than
local in character or that it interposes any barrier to commerce.
Until Congress undertakes the protection of local communities
from the dishonesty of the sellers of steamship tickets, it would
seem that there is no adequate ground for holding that the regulation here involved is a prohibited interference with commerce."
Mr. Justice Brandeis concurred in the dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Stone, and Mr. Justice Holmes concurred in both
dissenting opinions.
When contracts call for the shipment of materials from
without the state and their assembling and installation within
the state, the issue whether the enterprise is one for which the
state may demand that a foreign corporation secure a license
depends upon whether the work in the state subsequent to shipment is regarded as merely ancillary to the contract of sale and
shipment or as an independent local act. The erection of lightning
rods 45 and of a railway signal system4 6 have been held to be
independent of the prior shipment of the materials, while the
assembling of a complicated artificial ice-making plant4 7 has been
regarded as an incident of the interstate sale of the materials.
Kansas City Stru'cturalSteel Co. v.Arkansas4 involved an extrastate concern which obtained a contract for the construction of
45

Browning v. Waycross, (1914) 233 U. S. 16, 34 Sup. Ct. 578, 58

L. Ed.8 828.
" General Ry. Signal Co. v. Virginia, (1918) 246 U. S.500, 38
Sup.47Ct. 360, 62 L. Ed. 854, noted in 84 Cent. L. J. 4.
York Mfg. Co. v. Colley, (1918) 247 U. S.21, 38 Sup. Ct. 430,
62 L. Ed. 969, noted in 27 Yale L. J.1094.
48(1925) 269 U. S.148, 46 Sup. Ct. 59, 70 L. Ed. 204, discussed in
Joseph W. Newbold, "The 'Local Transaction' in Interstate Commerce," 12 Iowa L. Rev. 30; and notes in 14 Calif. L. Rev. 334 and
39 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 511. Similar situations are considered in Elcanon

Isaacs, "Activities Subsequent to Interstate Commerce," 25 Mich. L.
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a bridge and then sublet all of the work except the erection of
the steel superstructure. It obtained a license before it began
this latter work, but was fined $1,000 for not having obtained a
license earlier. In sustaining the judgment of the state court
Mr. Justice Butler said:
"We need not consider whether, under the circumstances
shown, the making of the bid, the signing of the contract and
execution of the bond would be within the protection of the commerce clause, if these acts stood alone. But it is certain that
when all are taken together, the things done by plaintiff in error
in Arkansas before obtaining the permission constitute or include
intrastate business. The delivery of the materials to the subcontractor was essential to the building of the bridge, and that
was an intrastate and not an interstate transaction. The fact that
the materials had moved from Missouri into Arkansas did not
make the delivery of them to the subcontractor interstate commerce. So far as concerns the question here involved, the situation is the equivalent of what it would have been if the materials
had been shipped into the state and held for sale in a warehouse,
and had been furnished to the subcontractor by a dealer. We
think it plain that the plaintiff in error did business of a local
and intrastate character in Arkansas before it obtained permission."
This appears to treat the delivery of the materials to the
subcontractor to be used by him as ancillary to his subsequent
erection of the piers and foundations and not ancillary to the
prior introduction of the materials. It was, of course, ancillary
to both. If the subcontractor had been a purchaser of the
materials and ordered them from without the state, the delivery
to their place of use would certainly be within the protection of
the commerce clause notwithstanding the fact that the vendor
shipped them into the state to its own order. The facts do not
disclose whether the contract between the bidder and the subcontractor made the latter in form a purchaser of the materials
which he was to use. If he were merely hired to assemble
materials furnished by the bidder, the bidder might perhaps be
regarded as co-operating in the work done by the subcontractor,
though this would seem" somewhat fantastic. As the case stands,
Rev. 740; and notes in 99 Cent. L. J. 255, 275, on foreign corporation
consigning goods to local merchants as doing business in the state;
in 2 Ind. L. J. 688 on contract to deliver and install an ammonia
compressor; in 11 Ky. L. J. 231 on excluding from the state courts
a foreign corporation doing only interstate commerce; in 21 Mich.
L. Rev. 699 on foreign corporation shipping goods into the state; and
in 3 Wis. L. Rev. 100 on regulation of foreign corporations engaged
in interstate commerce.
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the concern that got the contract and furnished the materials
from without the state would have been held to be doing independent local business if it had sublet the whole of the construction work and had merely delivered to subcontractors the
materials shipped in to its own order. This would clearly be
unwarranted unless weight were to be given to the making of
the bid, the signing of the contract and the execution of the
bond. Those elements seem much more local than the delivery
of the materials, to which Mr. Justice Butler gives greater attention. His analogy of a simple local sale is inapposite because
:f the fundamental distinction between goods within the state
and goods without the state at the time of the negotiations for
their acquisition. Mr. Justice Stone dissented, but without
writing an opinion. The majority opinion certainly provokes
dissent even though the majority judgment may be one that could
find adequate reasons to support it.
A statute of New York forbidding the false and fraudulent
labeling of meat as "kosher" or as made under Orthodox Hebrew
requirements was sustained in Hygrade Provision Co. v. Shermzan4 even as applied to sales in the original packages of meat of
extra-state origin. On this point Mr. Justice Sutherland declared:
"Lewis & Fox Company is a Massachusetts corporation conducting a general provision supply business including the shipment and sale of original packages into and within the state
of New York. It is this situation which forms the basis of the
contention that the commerce clause is violated. It is enough to
say that the statutes now assailed are not aimed at interstate
commerce, do not impose a direct burden upon such commerce,
make no discrimination against it, are fairly within the range
of the police power of the state, bear a reasonable relation to
the legitimate purpose of the enactments, and do not conflict with
any congressional regulation. Under these circumstances they
are not invalid because they may incidentally affect interstate
commerce."
The case arose through an injunction against the enforcement
of the statute, so that the case at bar dealt with allegations of
a general business rather than with any specific sale. The
declarations in the opinion seem broad enough to apply to sales
requiring interstate shipment for their delivery as well as to
49(1925) 266 U. S. 497, 45 Sup. Ct. 141, 69 L. Ed. 402. Mr. Justice
Brandeis did not sit.
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sales in original packages subsequent to interstate shipment.5"
This Kosher Case is the only one in which the Supreme Court
during the past five years has sustained a statute concededly
dealing with sales that are within the protection of the commerce
clause. The only other regulations sustained were those involving
fur dealers and a bridge construction company whose enterprises
were held to be respectively anterior to and subsequent to interstate commerce. The fur dealers' situation is anomalous owing
to the power of the state over the capture of wild game. In all
the cases in which state power was frustrated, the regulations
were to be enforced by the requirement of a license with penalties
attached to doing business without a license. A number of the
statutes lumped together a collection of requirements. The New
York kosher statute contented itself with the prohibition of sales
of falsely-labelled meat or of combining the business of selling
kosher and non-kosher products without announcing that both
are dealt in. This difference between the statute sustained and
those annulled suggests that the states invite conflict with the
commerce clause when they wrap a collection of requirements in
a single comprehensive statute which requires a license as a
condition of doing business and imposes a penalty for doing business without a license. From the standpoint of hurdling the
barrier of the commerce clause, the states may do better to put
each requirement in a separate statute with only a light penalty
attached and with no cumulation of penalties for continuing
neglects. They might thereby secure judicial approval of many
provisions which now fall by the wayside ih the judicial condemnation of the mode of enforcing a collection of restraints
some of which are thought to interfere too grievously with interstate commerce. This avoidance of cumulating various regulations in a single statute requiring a license as a condition of
doing business may sacrifice the most effective mode of enforcing
the commands of the law-makers, but better enforcement provisions might be substituted after the corimands themselves had
5°State regulation of sales of goods of extra-state origin is considered in Arthur H. Schwartz, "Legal Aspects of Convict Labor,"
16 J. Crim. L. 272, reprinted from a note in 25 Colum. L. Rev. 814;
W. A. Shumaker, "State Child Labor Laws," 26 Law Notes 185, sug-

gesting the possibility of Congressional action allowing state laws to
apply to goods from other states; and notes in 6 Boston U. L. Rev.
184 on sales of goods of extra-state origin, and in 40 Harv. L. Rev.
654 on prohibition of the sale of newspapers containing gambling information or advertising cigarettes.
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successfully run the gauntlet of the commerce clause. Where
penalties are moderate and not cumulative and where no license
is required, it is not so easy for complainants to convince the
court of the threat of irreparable injury and thereby secure an
injunction against the state officials. In these injunction proceedings not infrequently the court is satisfied to hold that the
state has done too much without telling how much too much.
North Dakota amended its grain-buyers' statute after its first
mishap, only to find that its new statute must suffer the same
fate. Other states may receive similar set-backs if they try to
avoid adverse decisions by revised statutes which merely eliminate the features in the fallen law which the court seemed to
regard as especially obnoxious. It may be wiser to start afresh
and proceed with caution with a view to securing the most that
the Supreme Court will sanction rather than to aim at the most
that the local interests may demand.
Rights of Action and Subjection to Suit. It is settled that
state statutes closing the door of the state co.urts to foreign corporations that have not obtained a license to do business and given
consent to service on a state officer as a means in initiating
actions against them cannot be applied to deny the right to sue
on a contract of interstate commerce. This has been applied
where the foreign corporation is vendee as well as where it is
vendor. Flatagan v. Federal Coal Co.51 applies the same principle to denial of right of recovery by an individual vendor for
breach of a contract adjudged to be an interstate-commerce transaction. The sale in question, as reported earlier, did not call for
extra-state delivery by the vendor, as is the case with most interstate sales, but was completed when the vendor delivered the article to a carrier for shipment to the vendee's customers in other
states.
A state statute authorizing suit against foreign corporations
by service on any agent in the state for solicitation of traffic over
lines outside the state was held in Davis v. Farmers' Co-Operative
Equity Co. - to be constitutionally inapplicable to a suit by a non51(1925) 267 U. S. 222, 45 Sup. Ct. 233, 69 L. Ed. 583.

Another

case involving an attempt of the state to prohibit recovery on a

contract when no certificate was filed is noted in 14 Ky. L. J. 356.
52(1923) 262 U. S. 312, 43 Sup. Ct. 556, 67 L. Ed. 996, treated in
Bernard C. Gavit, "Jurisdiction Over Causes of Action Against Interstate Carriers," 3 Ind. L. J. 130; and notes in 22 Mich. L. Rev. 77;
2 Wis. L. Rev. 433; and 33 Yale L. J. 547. Similar issues are considered in notes in 21 Ill. L. Rev. 724 on suits by non-residents against
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resident plaintiff on a transaction in no way connected with the
state against a foreign corporation. which neither owned nor
operated any railroad within the state. The decision was based
wholly on the commerce clause, thus leaving open the possibility
that the commerce clause protects from service of process where
the fourteenth amendment does not. After recognizing that "the
fact that the business carried on by a defendant is entirely interstate in character does not render the corporation immune from
the ordinary process of the courts of a state," Mr. Justice Brandeis
went on to say:
"It mai be that a statute like that here assailed would, be
valid although applied to suits in which the cause of action arose
elsewhere, if the ,transaction out of which it arose had been
,entered upon within the state, or if the plaintiff was, when it
arose, a resident of the state. These questions are not before
us, and we express no opinion upon them. But orderly, effective
administration of justice clearly does not require that a foreign
carrier shall submit to a suit in a state in which the cause of
action did not arise, in which the transaction giving rise to it
was not entered upon; in which the carrier neither owns nor operates a railroad, and in which the plaintiff does not reside.
• Avoidance of waste in interstate transportation, as well
as maintenance of service, has become a direct concern of the
public. With these ends the Minnesota statute, as here applied,
unduly interferes. By requiring from interstate carriers general
submission to suit, it unreasonably obstructs, and unduly burdens,
interstate commerce.!
This decision was the basis of a similar holding in Atchison,
T. & S. F. 1?. Co. v. Wells5 3 which sustained a suit in a federal
court to enjoin the enforcement of a judgment obtained in a
state court by a non-resident plaintiff on an extra-state cause of
action against a foreign corporation not admitted to do business
in the state nor consenting to be sued there, not owning or operating any line of railroad in the state and having no agent there.
The judgment had been obtained in an actiQn begun by garnishment and attachment proceedings directed to a domestic corporation which had in its possession cars belonging to the defendant named in the suit and which owed the defendant sums
foreign carriers on foreign causes of action; in 22 Mich. L. Rev. 77
on service on soliciting agent of foreign railway company; in 7
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 346 on jurisdiction for garnishment in actions
against foreign corporations on obligations arising outside the state;
and in 2 N. Y. L. Rev. 211 on service of process on foreign corporations.
53(1924) 265 U. S. 101, 44 Sup. Ct. 469, 68 L. Ed. 928, discussed
in 38 Harv. L. Rev. 117 and in 9 St. Louis L. Rev. 316.
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due on traffic balances. Mr. Justice Brandeis pointed out that
the garnishment and attachment proceedings were not improper
because the debts arose from interstate commerce transactions
or because the property was employed in interstate commerce.
Their invalidity arose from the fact that they were a means
of enforcing a cause of action in every way so alien to the state
in which it was brought that, to require the defendant to defend
it there would unduly burden interstate commerce.
The cases using the commerce clause as a bar to garnishment
or attachment proceedings where the defendant interstate carrier
did no business and where no incidents of the transaction in
question had occurred and where the plaintiff did not live were
distinguished in Missouri ex rel. St. Louis, Brownsville & Mexico
Railway Co. v. Taylor 54 where Mr. Justice Brandeis presented
the facts and conclusion as follows:
"Here, the plaintiff consignee is a resident of Missouri [where
the garnishment proceedings were had against traffic balances due
from another interstate carrier], that is, has. a usual place of
business within the state; the shipment out of which the cause
of action arose was of goods deliverable in Missouri; and, for
aught that appears, the negligence complained of occurred within
Missouri. To require that, under such circumstances, the foreign
carrier shall submit to suit within a state to whose jurisdiction it
would otherwise be amenable by process of attachment does not
unreasonably burden interstate commerce."
A footnote states that only one -of the three shipments on
account of which suit was brought was deliverable in Missouri,
but that as the issue was whether prohibition should issue against
the garnishment proceedings it was enough that the action could
be sustained in any part. This leaves open the question whether
claims unrelated to the state of the forum can be joined with
claims arising therein or related to transactions therein. The
plaintiff in the present action was a Delaware corporation with
an established place of business in Missouri. It will take more
cases to let us know whether this would be enough to entitle it
to sue an interstate carrier by garnishment proceedings on transactions having no relation to the state in question and to let us
know whether the domicil or residence of the plaintiff is immaterial if the transaction has enough to do with the state where
suit is brought. The principal case held it not important that
an action in the federal court could not be brought in the district
where this state action was brought.
54(1924) 266 U. S. 200, 45 Sup. Ct. 47, 69 L. Ed. 247.
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If the suit is brought in the state in which the defendant
carrier corporation is chartered and in a county through which
its line runs and in which it has an office and an agent for the
transaction of business, Hoffman v. Missouri ex rel. Foraker55
sanctions it, notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff is a nonresident and the action is for an injury suffered in the state
of plaintiff's residence which is also the residence of defendant's
material witnesses where defendant is confessedly subject to
suit. The hardship of withdrawing eleven witnesses from their
labors in interstate commerce and transporting them to the home
state of the defendant to testify there was regarded as one of
those "incidental burdens" on interstate commerce which must
be borne. Mr. Justice Brandeis twice mentions that the defendant was doing business in its home state, but does not otherwise
indicate whether this element in the situation was deemed an
essential one.
While the commerce clause was not adduced in support of
the complaint unsuccessfully advanced in Hess v. Pawloski " that
a state may not make the use of the highways by a non-resident
equivalent to the appointment by him of a state officer as his
agent to receive service of process in actions against him growing
out of accidents arising from such use, Mr. Justice Butler in
his opinion cited a commerce-clause decision5 7 for the propositions
55(1927) 274 U. S. 21, 47 Sup. Ct. 485, 71 L. Ed. 905. This case
is considered in the article by Mr. Gavit, "Jurisdiction Over Causes
of Action Against Interstate Carriers," 3 Ind. L. J. 130.
56(1927)' 274 U. S. 352, 47 Sup. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 698, treated in
Harry John Meleski, "The Case of Hess v. Pawlowski," 2 Boston
Univ. L. Rev. 254; and notes in 41 Harv. L. Rev. 94; 31 Law Notes
82; 26 Mich. L .Rev. 201; 2 Temple L. Rev. 61; 1 U. Cin. L. Rev. 486;
76 U. Pa. L. Rev. 93; 4 Wis. L. Rev. 307. The decision in the state court
is discussed in Edward W. Hinton, "Substituted Service on Non-Residents," 20 Ill. L. Rev. 7, reprinted in 59 Am. L. Rev. 592; Austin W.
Scott, "Jurisdiction Over Non-Resident Motorists," 39 Harv. L. Rev. 563,
reprinted in 60 Am. L. Rev. 403; and notes in 5 Boston U. L. Rev. 46; 25
Colum. L. Rev. 204; 38 Harv. L. Rev. 111; 9 MINNESJTA LAw REvIEw 362,
381; 73 U. Pa. L. Rev. 171; 11 Va. L. Rev. 144; and 34 Yale L. J. 415.
Similar problems are treated in 25 Mich. L. Rev. 538, 4 Wis. L. Rev. 189;
and 35 Yale L. J. 113, 415.
For a discussion of Buck v. Kuykendall, (1925) 267 U. S. 307, 45
Sup. Ct. 324, 69 L. Ed. 623, and Bush & Sons Co. v. Maloy, (1925) 267
U. S. 317, 45 Sup. Ct. 326, 69 L. Ed. 627, reviewed in 12 MINNESOTA LAW
REVIEW 328, see in addition to references previously given, C. M.
Kneier, "The Regulation of Interstate Motor Transportation," 16 Nat.
Mun.57 Rev. 510.
Kane v. New Jersey, (1916) 242 U. S. 160, 37 Sup. Ct. 30, 61
L. Ed. 222, discussed in 5 Calif. L. Rev. 252. Compare Hendrick v.
Maryland, (1915) 235 U. S. 610, 35 Sup. Ct. 140, 59 L. Ed. 385, noted in
80 Cent. L. J. 123; 51 Nat. Corp. Rep. 140; and 20 Va. L. Rev. 869.
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that the state may require a formal appointment of an agent to
receive process as a pre-requisite to use of the highways by a
non-resident and exclude him from such use until the appointment is made, thus recognizing that in the absence of Congressional action the use of the highways on an interstate journey
may subject the user to a suit instituted by service of process
on a state official. Limitations on the exercise of such a power
may be inferrable from the fact that the opinion points out that
the statute requires that the non-resident "shall actually receive
and receipt for notice of the service and a copy of the process"
and that "it contemplates such continuances as may be found
necessary to give reasonable time and opportunity for defense."
While the liabilities of interstate carriers for loss or injury
incident to interstate transportation are now pretty largely fixed
by congressional statutes or by Supreme Court views promulgated
under the assumption that Congress by taking over the field has
tacitly yearned to have the Supreme Court apply its views rather
than the dictates of any state statute or state court, the actions
against the carriers may still be brought in state courts and some
incidents of the right of action may still be controlled by state
law. Cases involving these issues are to be reviewed in a later
section, but those in which state power has been sanctioned may
appropriately be listed here. A state court may entertain a
cause of action under the Carmack Amendment although the
defendant could not be served with process in the district had
the action been brought in a federal court."
The state court
may refuse to entertain the suit if the cause of action has been
barred by the state statute of limitations.59 Such a cause of action
completely barred by a state statute prior to the Transportation
Act was not revived by that statute. 0 It is for state law to determine whether garnishment against the carrier is proper in an
action against the consignee as defendant after the consignee has
taken possession and begun unloading.8 1 The rights of a conditional vendee of a vessel as against the vendor who had regained possession in admiralty proceedings saving the rights of
5 8Missouri ex rel. St. Louis, B. & M. R. Co. v. Taylor, (1924)
266 U. S. 200, 45 Sup. Ct. 47, 69 L. Ed. 247.
5OLouisiana & S. W. R. Co. v. Gardiner, (1927) 273 U. S. 280, 47
Sup. Ct. 386, 71 L. Ed. 644.
OFullerton-Krueger Lumber Co. v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co.,
(1925) 266 U. S. 435, 45 Sup. Ct. 143, 69 L. Ed. 367.
61 Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Durham Co., (1926) 271 U. S. 251,
46 Sup. Ct. 509, 70 L. Ed. 931.
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the vendee under the state statute may be determined in accordance
with the provisions of the state Conditional Sales Act, when the
sale was prior to the federal Jones Act and no interests of third
parties are involved. 62 A state statute regulating liability for
loss of baggage in intrastate commerce, which was suspended by
the federal control of the roads during the war, revived without
3
re-enactment as soon as the period of federal guarantee expired.
Conclusion. Aside from the cases to be considered again more
in detail in the ensuing instalment on state power after Congressional action, we have here dealt with fourteen cases in which
some state regulation was found to be offensive to the commerce
clause and nine cases in which the state regulation was sustained.
Four of the nine went on the ground that the commerce involved
was not interstate. Of the five cases. sustaining state prescriptions
applied to interstate commerce, three related to subjection to suit
and the remaining two allowed regulation of the load of motor
vehicles and of the sale of food products. Six of the decisions
affirmed state courts and three affirmed federal district courts. In
only one case was there dissent. Mr. Justice Stone could not
agree that a company with a contract to erect a bridge had engaged
in local commerce before beginning its work of construction.
The fourteen cases in which state- laws were declared inapplicable reveal more difference of opinion both among the members
of the Supreme Court and between the Supreme Court and lower
courts: West Virginia's idea that charity in natural gas should
begin at home was rejected in a proceeding in which the Supreme
Court got original jurisdiction in a suit between states. Justices
Holmes, McReynolds and Brandeis dissented, though the dissent
of- Mr. Justice McReynolds was formally confined to the issue
of jurisdiction. Justices Holmes, Brandeis and Stone dissented in
the case which saved brokers of steamship -tickets from a license
requirement; Mr. Justice -McReynolds dissented in -two cases
holding that a- certificate of- public convenience may not be required -of an interstate motor bus; and Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented in cases preventing North Dakota from regulating sale of
grain to elevators and preventing Rhode Island from fixing the
price of electricity transmitted to Massachusetts. In the other
eight cases the Supreme Court was unanimous. The fourteen
62Stewart & Co. v. Rivara, (1927) 274 U. S. 614, 47 Sup. Ct. 718,
71 L. Ed. 1234.
63Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Boone, (1926) 270 U. S. 466, 46 Sul
Ct. 341, 70 L. Ed. 688.
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cases involved fifteen cases from lower courts. State courts were
sustained in one case and reversed in six cases. Circuit courts of
appeal were reversed in two cases. Federal district courts were
reversed in one case and sustained in five cases.
In the twenty-three cases under consideration, the Supreme
Court was unanimous in sixteen. Of the seven dissents, five were
of one justice only and two were of three justices. In the twentyfour cases which came frorni lower courts, there were nine reversals and fifteen affirmances of the judgment below. In three of
the affirmances the Supreme Court was not unanimous. Mr. Justice Brandeis was a dissenter in four cases, Mr. Justice McReynolds in three, Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Stone in
two each. The only two dissents which could muster more than
one justice were those from the decisions forbidding a state to
license brokers of steamship tickets and to give to residents a preference in the use of natural gas. There was ample doctrinal precedent for both of these decisions, but there were also ample doctrinal wrappings for contrary decisions. The true doctrine is that
the states may regulate interstate commerce some, but not too
much. This is the doctrine to be derived from the adjudications if
we use "regulate" in a factual sense. The judges, however, are
prone to use "regulate" as a word of art to apply to the regulations
,that regulate too much, and they thereby all too often find it easy
to write an opinion which condemns a state statute without showing in detail why the con'siderations in its favor are outweighed
by the considerations against it. The notable dissent of Mr.
Justice Stone in the Di Santo Case 4 should be pinned on the wall
of the study of every Justice of the Supreme Court to serve as a
guide in the writing of opinions even in cases where no one has
any doubt that the interests of unimpeded commerce outweigh the
local need for regulation. Unless the competing considerations
which must have been voiced in the conference room are made explicit in the opinions, counsel may not be forewarned of the factors
that induce judgment and so may continue to write briefs and
make arguments that exalt excessive generalizations at the expense
of concrete analysis.
(To be concluded.)

04

Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, (1927) 273 U. S. 34, 47 Sup. Ct. 267,

71 L. Ed. 314.

